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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED CLARK, et al., ) 
v. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,l 
Case No. 17093 
DEE C. HANSEN, State Engineer, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated as an attempt to review the Deci-
sion of the State Engineer approving Application No. 50723, 
filed by L. Derral Christensen. However, prior to the filing 
of this action, the State Engineer withdrew that Decision by 
granting a Rehearing on Application No. 50723. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent State Engineer moved to dismiss Appellants' Com-
plaint on the grounds that the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, since there was no final decision of the 
State Engineer for the Court to review, and also that the app-
licant was an indispensable party to the action. The District 
Court concluded that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed 
the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent State Engineer seeks to affirm the Order of the 
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Fourth Judicial District Court dismissing this action. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent State Engineer does not believe that there is 
any substantial disagreement between the parties concerning the 
basic facts of this case, but there are certain additional facts-
omitted by Appellants from their Statement--which are relevant to 
the Court's consideration of this matter. Consequently, we be-
lieve the following summary more completely reflects the relevant 
facts in this case. 
Application No. 50723 was filed by L. Derral Christensen to 
appropriate groundwater in Juab County, Utah (R. 6-8). Notice 
of this Application was given by publication in the local news-
paper, and the subject Application was protested by the Deseret 
Irrigation Company, Melville Irrigation Company, Abraham Irriga-
tion Company, Delta Canal Company, Jack M. Nelson, Steel Mcintyre, 
and Gordon and Barbara Nielson (R. 6-7). But this Application 
was not protested by any of the Appellants in this action, nor 
did they participate in the administrative hearing subsequently 
held by the State Engineer to consider the protests which had 
been filed (R. 6-7) . 
The State Engineer issued a Memorandum Decision on January 
18, 1980, approving Application No. 50723 (R. 6-7). On February 
13, 1980, the State Engineer received a "Petition for Reconsid-
eration" from the Deseret Irrigation Company, Melville Irriga-
2 
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tion Company, Abraham Irrigation Company and Delta Canal Com-
pany--all of whom had protested the approval of this Applica-
tion--to reconsider the issues associated with Application 
No. 50723. The State Engineer granted a Rehearing on February 
20, 1980 (R. 20). The Rehearing was held on March 12, 1980 
(R. 22), which was the same day Appellants filed their Complaint 
(R. 1). The State Engineer has not yet issued any further deci-
sion regarding Application No. 50723. 
Appellants' Complaint sought a reversal of the State Engi-
neer's January 18, 1980, Decision approving Application No. 
50723 (R. 5). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the action 
on the grounds that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because the granting of the Rehearing by the State Engineer with-
drew his prior Decision, and thus he had not yet made a final 
decision within the meaning of Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended (R. 15-23). Respondent's Motion to Dis-
miss also asserted that the applicant, L. Derral Christensen, 
was an indispensable party to any action to review his Applica-
tion (R. 16). 
The District Court dismissed this action for lack of juris-
diction following consideration of memoranda and oral argument 
by the parties (R. 61-62). Appellants' appeal challenges that 
decision. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION TO GRANT REHEARING ON APPLICATION NO. 50723 
WAS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE STATE ENGINEER AND WAS FULLY 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. The Need of the State Engineer for Rehearings as Part 
of the Administrative Process 
The Legislature has delegated to the State Engineer the 
primary responsibility for the administration and allocation of 
the water resources of the State (§73-2-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amend-
ed). All applications to appropriate water, as well as change 
applications, must be filed with and initially ruled upon by the 
State Engineer (§§73-3-2 and -3). This is also the situation 
with extension of time requests on approved but unperfected app-
lications and changes (§73-3-12). Thus, the State Engineer 
makes literally hundreds of decisions each year on water right 
matters and, while all of his final decisions are subject to 
appeal pursuant to the provisions of §73-3-14, only a few are 
in fact appealed. There is a significant need to allow the ad-
ministrative process to run its full course before a court re-
views a matter. This is aptly illustrated in this case, where 
the State Engineer is dealing with complex hydrologic and geo-
logic questions associated with the availability of groundwater 
and the relationship between a proposed appropriation and al-
ready established and existing water rights and other claims. 
This is an involved, detailed, and technical matter. Certainly 
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there is every reason to allow the State Engineer to make a 
complete evaluation of a matter before a Court reviews it--
including holding a Rehearing if one is requested and the State 
Engineer believes, under all the facts and circumstances, that 
it should be granted. 
Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of 
an administrative agency prior to its completion and 
which in this sense is not final. This reluctance 
has found expression in the manner in which courts 
construe constitutional provisions to limit the 
availability of judicial review of such action, in 
rules relating to timing judicial relief developed 
by the courts apart from any constitutional necessity, 
such as the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, in a general requirement of "ripeness for 
review," and final action by the administrative agency 
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. 
Such requirements involve a determination of the par-
ticular stage at which a person may secure review of 
administrative action and the immediacy of the impact 
of such action and impingement upon an asserted right, 
as well as the focusing of issues for effective judi-
cial determination, the opportunity for subsequent 
challenge to the determination, and the freedom of 
the agency to bring its action to fruition without 
judicial intervention. The requirements are often 
stated in terms of the particular remedy in which 
judicial relief is sought. Thus, it is said that it 
is the general rule that administrative action which 
is not final cannot be attacked in an injunction pro-
ceeding, the reason being that absent a final order 
or decision, power has not been fully and finally 
exercised and there can usually be no irreparable 
harm; and that where administrative intention is ex-
pressed but has not yet come to fruition or where that 
intention is unknown, the controversy is not yet ripe 
for equitable intervention. (2 Am.Jur.2d Administra-
tive Law, §583, pp. 410, 411). 
5 
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B. The State Engineer has Authority to Grant Rehearings 
The underpinning for Appellants' case is that the State 
Engineer is completely without authority to rehear any aspect 
of one of his decisions. Under Appellants' theory, the State 
Engineer could not ever correct minor mistakes, nor make any 
adjustments to any of his decisions--however necessary to or 
desirable in the interests of the parties. Certainly this 
should not be the case. Section 73-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, specifies that: 
The state engineer shall keep his off ice at the 
state capitol, but all proceedings and hearings 
requiring the attendance of water users and wit-
nesses shall be held within the county where the 
land is located. 
Further, with respect to the authority of the State Engineer, 
Section 73-2-1 provides, in part, that: 
He shall have power to make and publish such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary from time to 
time fully to carry out the duties of his office, 
and particularly to secure the equitable and fair 
apportionment and distribution of the water accord-
ing to the respective rights of appropriators . . 
. . 
Pursuant to his statutory authority and the provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Rule-making Act (§63-46-1 et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended}, the State Engineer has 
adopted formal Rules governing his hearings and rehearings. 
Since the Legislature has delegated to the State Engineer the 
responsibility to decide whether an application to appropriate 
water should be approved or rejected based upon specified 
6 
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statutory criteria (§73-3-8), the State Engineer should 
have the authority to rehear and reconsider his decisions 
where appropriate. It must be remembered that decisions of 
the State Engineer are not completely final for sixty days 
following their issuance, as that is the time during which such 
decisions may be appealed (§73-3-14). This is not a situation 
where the State Engineer is attempting to leave uncertainty in 
the decision-making process. The State Engineer realizes the 
need for certainty and finality in this area. The twenty-day 
time period (or some reasonable extension thereof) within which 
to petition for a rehearing is not an effort on the part of the 
State Engineer to leave his decisions open-ended. Appellants' 
naked assertion that the State Engineer violated his own Rules 
(by granting a Rehearing when the request was not filed within 
the twenty-day period provided for in those Rules) ignores the 
fact that these Rules also provide that for good cause the twenty-
day period may be extended--as it was in this instance. The fact 
that Appellants were not aware of such extension is not surpris-
ing, since they were not involved in the administrative proceed-
ings before the State Engineer. Consequently, Appellants' re-
liance upon West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Comm., 
537 P.2d 1027 (Ut. 1975), is clearly unjustified. Further, a 
court will not override an agency's interpretation of its own 
rules unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous (McKnight 
v. State Land Bd., 14 Ut.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963)). Of course, 
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once the sixty-day appeal period provided for in Section 
73-3-14 passes, the State Engineer's decision becomes final 
and he cannot consider new or additional evidence dealing with 
the substantive criteria governing his decision on an applica-
tion. And he does not suggest otherwise. But there are times 
when fairness and justice dictate that a rehearing should be 
granted. Such a procedure is fully consistent with the author-
ity granted the State Engineer in this specialized and technical 
area, and is also in the best interests of the public. The 
authority to rehear a matter has been recognized as being in-
herent within the power to initially decide the matter. Davis, 
in his Treatise on Administrative Law (1958), at §18.09, states: 
Every tribunal, judicial or administrative, has some 
power to correct its own errors or otherwise approp-
riately modify its judgment, decree, or order. 
Also, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, at §525, states: 
.. it is held that an administrative agency may 
reopen its determination to permit the introduction 
of further evidence, or reconsider, modify, or change 
its determination by reason of newly discovered evi-
dence, or to meet changed conditions, except as re-
stricted by statute or ordinance. 
This rule has been recognized and approved in a number of States: 
The question then arises whether the Cornmission has 
jurisdiction to further reconsider its decisions. As 
to this, the answer must be in the affirmative. The 
power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decI"de. 
Albertson v. Federal Communications Commission, 87 U.S. 
App.D.C. 39, 182 F.2d 397. The Commission had the jur-
isdiction to entertain the second motion and the power 
to grant or deny it. (Wammack v. Industrial Comm. of 
Arizona, 320 P.2d 920, 954 (Ariz. 1958); Emphasis Added}. 
8 
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In Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 71 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1950), 
the New Jersey Court ruled that: 
In analogy to the authority of courts of general 
jurisdiction at common law, administrative tribun-
als possess the inherent power of reconsideration 
of their judicial acts, except as qualified by stat-
ute. This function arises by necessary implication 
to serve the statutory policy. (71 A.2d at 627). 
Also, see Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bongards Co-op Cream. Ass'n., 
91 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1958); Spanish International Broadcasting 
Co. v. Federal Communications Co., 385 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir. 1967); 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process P. Co., 104 S.W.2d 1106 
(Tex. 1937); Ruvoldt v. Noland, 305 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1973); and 
Equitable Trust Co. v. Hamilton, 123 N.E. 380 (1919). 
In evaluating the power to grant a rehearing, courts have 
also looked with favor where, as here, the request for rehear-
ing must be filed prior to the time that the period for seeking 
judicial review has expired. The Delaware Supreme Court, in 
Henry v. Dept. of Labor, 293 A.2d 578 (Del. 1972), stated: 
No provision in Title 19, Delaware Code, chapter 33 
provides the Board with the power to grant a rehear-
ing. In Delaware, however, a public body exercising 
judicial functions inherently has the power, even 
without statutory authority, to reopen and reconsider 
a decision until it loses jurisdiction. In Lyons v. 
Delaware Liquor Commission, 5 Del.Gen.Sess. 304, 58 
A.2d 889 (1948), where a decision by the Delaware Li-
quor Commission refusing to grant a liquor license 
was affirmed, the Commission granted a motion for re-
hearing and vacated a previous order before the per-
iod for seeking judicial review had expired. (293 
A.2d at 581). 
See also Bd. of Education v. Iowa State Bd. of Public Instr., 
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157 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1968). This Court has recoanized the need 
J 
for a reasonable interpretation of statutory grants of authority 
to administrative agencies to carry out agency responsibilities 
(McGarry v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 592, 232 Pac. 1090 (1925)). 
c. Established Administrative Practice is Presumed Valid 
The State Engineer adopted Rules of Procedure for Hear-
ings {which includes procedures governing rehearings discussed 
above) in 1974, pursuant to the provisions of §73-2-1 and the 
Utah Administrative Rule-making Act {§63-46-1 et seq.). Where 
the Rules promulgated by the State Engineer are in response to 
express statutory authority and there is no showing that such 
Rules exceed his authority, his action is presumed to be valid: 
As an administrative agency statutorily created and 
endowed with specific enumerated powers and duties 
delegated pursuant to the police power of the state, 
the Board's exercise of those powers within the 
scope of its authority is entitled to a presumption 
of validity and constitutionality . . . . Here, 
specific authority is delegated to make rules and 
regulations as may be necessary for the regulation 
of the practice of pharmacy and the lawful perform-
ance of the duties of the Board, including the reg-
ulation of the sale of drugs and medicines. C.R.S. 
1963, 48-1-2{1) (d) and {e). The presumption of val-
idity of the rules regularly promulgated is not to 
be lightly cast aside by mere allegations in a com-
plaint of unconstitutionality, and the burden is upon 
the party challenging the constitutionality to estab-
lish by a clear and convincing showing beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the asserted invalidity. This requires 
more than a mere assertion of a claim. (Moore v. 
District Court, 518 P.2d 948, 951 {1974)). 
Also, the Utah Legislature has met on a number of occasions 
since the State Engineer's Rules of Procedure for Hearings were 
adopted, and no effort has been made to change, modify or adjust 
10 
f 
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the State Engineer's authority in this area. Legislative 
acquiescence in an administrative practice may be inferred 
from silence for a number of years (United States v. Midwest 
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); United States v. Philbrick, 120 
U.S. 52 (1887); and Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 389 U.S. 975 (1967)). 
D. Appellants' Inconsistent Position 
There is a fundamental and basic inconsistency in 
Appellants' position in this matter. Appellants express pro-
found concern over the potential impact of Application No. 50723 
on certain of their unidentified claims. It is most difficult 
to square this professed concern with Appellants' actions. The 
Utah Water Code provides interested parties with ample opportun-
ity to protest any new application to appropriate water. Notice 
of all such applications must be advertised once a week for three 
weeks in a local newspaper (§73-3-6). There is a thirty-day pro-
test period following publication of the final notice {§73-3-7) . 
Appellants chose not to protest Application No. 50723 and give 
the State Engineer an opportunity to consider their objection, 
but, rather, waited until a Decision had been made by the State 
Engineer and then criticize that Decision for not considering 
whatever objections Appellants may have had. Thus, this is not 
a situation where a water user who made his case before the State 
Engineer and lost is seeking to have the State Engineer's Decision 
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reviewed by the Court. Rather, it is a situation where parties-
who claim to be seriously concerned about their potential claims 
to water--have ignored the established administrative process 
and, instead, seek recourse directly from the Court. To allow 
parties to ignore or bypass the administrative proceedings before 
the State Engineer is completely at odds with the Utah Water Code, 
which places the responsibility for water allocation with the 
State Engineer (with his decisions being subject to court review). 
Such a result would be inconsistent with the concept of a trial 
de nova as contemplated under §§73-3-14 and -15 (Bullock v. Tracy, 
4 Ut.2d 370, 294 P.2d 707 (1956)). Appellants' actions fall woe-
fully short of supporting the claims and arguments which they are 
advancing to this Court. 
E. Lack of Harm to Appellants 
It is extremely difficult to understand Appellants' basic 
concern at this stage of the proceedings before the State Engi-
neer, and also their reluctance to let the administrative pro-
cess be completed. The State Engineer has held his Rehearing on 
Application No. 50723, and---while he has not yet issued a deci-
sion--if he were to now reject this Application Appellants' Com-
plaint would be moot. Of course, the applicant might then seek 
court review of the decision. If, on the other hand, the State 
Engineer affirms the approval of the subject Application, that 
would then be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to 
12 
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the provisions of §73-3-14. Thus, it is difficult to see where 
Appellants are running any risk at all as a result of the Re-
hearing, or have any standing to complain about the Rehearing 
of this matter in any event, since they have refused to parti-
cipate in the administrative process. 
F. Appellants' Cases 
The cases upon which Appellants rely do not support 
their argument. First, with respect to Smith v. Sanders, 112 
Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701 (1948}, we have no quarrel with this 
Court's conclusion that §73-3-14 provides the exclusive means 
of seeking judicial review of a decision of the State Engineer. 
However, the Court there was discussing a final decision of the 
State Engineer after the sixty-day appeal period had elapsed. 
There was no consideration or discussion of the matter of rehear-
ing by the State Engineer within that sixty-day period. 
In Laws v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 432, 211 P.2d 
194 (1949), this Court ruled that the Industrial Commission could 
not adopt a regulation dealing with denial of medical expenses 
which was inconsistent with a statute allowing such expenses. 
That is not the situation here. There is no statutory prohibi-
tion against rehearings by the State Engineer. McKnight v. State 
Land Board, 14 Ut.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963}, can be of little 
comfort to Appellants. There, the rules and regulations were 
found to be consistent with the statutory authority of the Land 
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Board. This Court also pointed out in that case that ad.minis-
trative agencies have the power and authority necessary and 
proper to accomplish their statutory objectives and duties (14 
Ut.2d at 245). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE REHEAR-
ING ON APPLICATION NO. 50723, AND DISMISSED THE ACTION 
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
which governs the review of decisions of the State Engineer, 
clearly contemplates a final decision of the State Engineer as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite to any such appeal. That situa-
tion does not exist here. The effect of granting a rehearing 
deprives the prior ruling of the finality required by §73-3-14. 
The jurisdiction of the subject Application is still before the 
State Engineer pending his decision on Rehearing. Once a review 
is made of the issues presented at the Rehearing, a final Memo-
randum Decision will be issued by the State Engineer which will 
be appealable under the provisions of §73-3-14. However, at 
this point in time there is simply nothing for a court to assume 
jurisdiction over for review, since the State Engineer's January 
18th Memorandum Decision was withdrawn by the granting of a Re-
hearing. Other water users have no legitimate complaint at this 
point. 
The pendency of a rehearing on a matter deprives a prior 
decision of its finality, thus leaving no subject matter for a 
14 
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court to review: 
As a general rule, when a rehearing is granted, 
the status of the case is the same as though no 
hearing had occurred. 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, 
Section 810. "At common law an order granting a 
rehearing operates as a reversal of the original 
decision." 4 C.J. 641; 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 
§1446. See also Hook v. Mercantile Trust Company, 
7 Cir., 95 F. 41, 36 C.C.A. 645. Though the filing 
of a petition for a rehearing does not vacate or 
annul a judgment, it suspends the judgment from the 
date of the filing of the petition. The granting 
of a rehearing withdraws an opinion previously ren-
dered and destroys its force and effect unless it 
is subsequently adopted by the same tribunal. 3 Am. 
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sections 809 and 811. (At-
lantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Cornrn'n., 
54 S.E.2d 169 (W.Va. 1949)). 
This Court, in the Laws case, supra, stated that: "The 
granting of a rehearing operates to vacate the award previously 
rendered, and to require the case be tried anew." (211 P.2d at 
198). Also, see Southland Industries v. Federal Communications 
Comm'n., 99 F.2d 117 (D.C.Cir. 1938); State Dept. of Ecology v. 
City of Kirkland, 523 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1974); and 2 Am.Jur.2d, 
Administrative Law, §587, pp. 417-418. Thus, it must follow 
that since only final orders or decisions are reviewable by the 
courts under statutes such as §73-3-14, there is no subject 
matter jurisdiction for this action. 
III. THE STATE ENGINEER CLEARLY HAS AUTHORITY FOR HIS 
ACTION ON APPLICATION TO APPROPRIATE NO. 50723 
Appellants argue that, since the State Engineer did not 
act upon certain applications to appropriate which Appellants 
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have filed in his office, any action taken by him with respect 
to Application No. 50723 is void ab initio because Application 
No. 50723 may have been filed subsequent to other unapproved 
applications in the same general area. This argument is totally 
without merit. First of all, there is no evidence or data before 
this Court demonstrating that the water source covered by Appli-
cation No. 50723 is the same water source covered by the appli-
cations of those Appellants having unapproved applications pend-
ing before the State Engineer. Further, Appellants are hardly 
in any position to complain about the State Engineer's adminis-
trative review of Application No. 50723, since they refused to 
participate in the administrative process, and are in fact trying 
to totally circumvent it. 
However, the more fundamental flaw in Appellants' argument 
is that the statutory provision governing the approval and re-
jection of applications to appropriate specifically allows the 
State Engineer to consider applications other than in the order 
they are filed. That statutory criteria is set forth in §73-3-8, 
and this Court has squarely ruled that the State Engineer is not 
bound to act upon applications to appropriate in their order of 
filing (see Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943)). 
Of course, Appellants' argument is really irrelevant at this 
point, since the State Engineer has not yet issued his final 
Decision on Application No. 50723. 
16 
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I, 
None of the statutes quoted in Point I of Appellants' 
Brief support the arguments which Appellants assert. For exaro-
ple, Appellants' reliance upon §73-3-1 is totally unwarranted. 
That section of the Water Code is simply a legislative recog-
nition and ratification of the appropriation doctrine which 
does provide that among those users having established rights, 
the user with the first priority shall receive his entire water 
supply before a subsequent user shall be entitled to any water. 
This section has absolutely nothing to do with unapproved appli-
cations, because such a user has no right to divert and use 
water until his application is approved. The State Engineer's 
action on unapproved applications is governed solely by the 
criteria set forth in §73-3-8. 
Appellants' reliance on McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 
201 P.2d 288 (1948} is likewise unfounded. The language quoted 
in Appellants' Brief was in the context of whether or not an un-
approved application could be transferred or assigned prior to 
approval by the State Engineer. The Court concluded that it 
could. However, there is not one word in that decision remotely 
suggesting that applications must be approved in the order in 
which they are filed. In fact, this Court, in McGarry, stated 
that no vested right to the use of water is acquired by the mere 
filing of an application (201 P.2d at 292}. Accord, Whitmore v. 
Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949} and Deseret Live Stock 
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Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479 (1925). 
IV. APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY 
It is difficult to understand exactly what Appellants' 
position is on this question, but in light of the lower court's 
decision that it was without jurisdiction over this action, 
there was no need to consider whether L. Derral Christensen 
(who filed the subject Application) was an indispensable party 
to this action, and the lower court did not address this ques-
tion. However, there can be no doubt but that the applicant 
would be an indispensable party to any adjudication on the mer-
its of said Application. This applicant had the opportunity to 
appear and defend his Application before the State Engineer, and 
must be provided the same opportunity in any subsequent proceed-
1ngs involving his Application (Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Ut. 
2d 196, 356 P.2d 631 (1960); also, see Hoyt v. Upper Marian 
Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234 (1938)). 
V. CONCLUSION 
This action was properly dismissed by the District Court 
for lack of jurisdiction since there is no final decision on 
Application No. 50723 as required by Section 73-3-14. 
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